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ABSTRACT
To what degree should societies allow inequality to be inherited? What role should estate taxation
play in shaping the intergenerational transmission of welfare? We explore these questions by
modeling altruistically-linked individuals who experience privately observed taste or productivity
shocks. Our positive economy is identical to models with infinite-lived individuals where efficiency
requires immiseration: inequality grows without bound and everyone's consumption converges to
zero.  However,  under  an  intergenerational  interpretation,  previous  work  only  characterizes  a
particular set of Pareto-efficient allocations: those that value only the initial generation's welfare. We
study other efficient allocations where the social welfare criterion values future generations directly,
placing a positive weight on their welfare so that the effective social discount rate is lower than the
private one. For any such difference in social and private discounting we find that consumption
exhibits mean-reversion and that a steady-state, cross-sectional distribution for consumption and
welfare exists, where no one is trapped at misery. The optimal allocation can then be implemented
by a combination of income and estate taxation. We find that the optimal estate tax is progressive:
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Abstract
To what degree should societies allow inequality to be inherited? What role should estate
taxation play in shaping the intergenerational transmission of welfare? We explore these ques-
tions by modeling altruistically-linked individuals who experience privately observed taste or
productivity shocks. Our positive economy is identical to models with in¯nite-lived individ-
uals where e±ciency requires immiseration: inequality grows without bound and everyone's
consumption converges to zero. However, under an intergenerational interpretation, previous
work only characterizes a particular set of Pareto-e±cient allocations: those that value only
the initial generation's welfare. We study other e±cient allocations where the social welfare
criterion values future generations directly, placing a positive weight on their welfare so that
the e®ective social discount rate is lower than the private one. For any such di®erence in social
and private discounting we ¯nd that consumption exhibits mean-reversion and that a steady-
state, cross-sectional distribution for consumption and welfare exists, where no one is trapped
at misery. The optimal allocation can then be implemented by a combination of income and
estate taxation. We ¯nd that the optimal estate tax is progressive: fortunate parents face
higher average marginal tax rates on their bequests.
1 Introduction
Societies inevitably choose the inheritability of inequality. Some balance between equality of oppor-
tunity for newborns and incentives for altruistic parents is struck. We explore how this balancing
act plays out to determine long-run inequality and draw some novel implications for optimal estate
taxation.
¤For useful discussions and comments we thank Daron Acemoglu, Fernando Alvarez, George-Marios Angeletos,
Abhijit Banerjee, Gary Becker, Olivier Blanchard, Ricardo Caballero, Dean Corbae, Mikhail Golosov, Bengt Holm-
strom, Narayana Kocherlakota, Robert Lucas, Casey Mulligan, Roger Myerson, Chris Phelan, Gilles Saint-Paul,
Nancy Stokey, Jean Tirole and seminar and conference participants at Chicago, Minnesota, MIT and the Texas
Monetary Conference held at the University of Austin in honor of the late Scott Freeman. This work begun moti-
vated by a seminar presentation of Chris Phelan at MIT in May 2004. We also have gained signi¯cant insight from
a manuscript by Scott Freeman and Michael Sadler|we thank Dean Corbae for bringing it to our attention.
1Existing normative models of inequality reach an extreme conclusion: inequality should be per-
fectly inheritable and rise steadily without bound, with everyone converging to absolute misery and
a vanishing lucky fraction to bliss. This immiseration result is robust; requires very weak assump-
tions on preferences (Phelan, 1998); and obtains invariably in partial equilibrium (Green, 1987,
Thomas and Worrall, 1990), in general equilibrium (Atkeson and Lucas, 1992), and across environ-
ments with moral-hazard regarding work e®ort or with private information regarding preferences
or productivity (Aiyagari and Alvarez, 1995).1
We depart minimally from these contributions, adopting the same positive economic models,
but a slightly di®erent normative criterion. In a generational context, previous work with in¯nite-
lived agents characterizes the instance where future generations are not considered directly, but
only indirectly through the altruism of earlier ones. On the opposite side of the spectrum, Phelan
(2005) proposes a social planner with equal weights on all future generations. Our interest here is in
exploring a class of Pareto-e±cient allocations that take into account the current population along
with unborn future generations. We place a positive and vanishing Pareto weight on the expected
utility of future generations, this leads e®ectively to a social discount rate that is lower than the
private one.
This relatively small change produces a drastically di®erent result: long-run inequality remains
bounded, a steady-state, cross-sectional distribution exists for consumption and welfare, social mo-
bility is possible and everyone avoids misery. Indeed, welfare typically remains above an endogenous
lower bound that is strictly better than misery. This outcome holds however small the di®erence
between social and private discounting, and regardless of whether the source of asymmetric infor-
mation is privately observed preferences or productivity shocks.
We begin by modeling a positive economy that is identical to the taste-shock setup developed
by Atkeson and Lucas (1992). Each generation is composed of a continuum of individuals who
live for one period and are altruistic towards a single descendant. There is a constant aggregate
endowment of the only consumption good in each period. Individuals are ex-ante identical, but
experience idiosyncratic shocks to preferences that are only privately observed|thus ruling out ¯rst-
best allocations. Feasible allocations must be incentive compatible and must satisfy the aggregate
resource constraint in all periods.
When only the welfare of the ¯rst generation is considered, the planning problem is equivalent
to that of an economy with in¯nite-lived individuals. Intuitively, immiseration then results from
the desire to smooth the dynastic consumption path: rewards and punishments, required for incen-
tives, are best delivered permanently. As a result, the consumption process inherits a random-walk
component that leads cross-sectional inequality to grow endlessly without bound. In¯nite spreading
of the distribution is consistent with a constant aggregate endowment only if everyone's consump-
1Many ¯nd the immiseration result perplexing and some even ¯nd it morally questionable, but it is also incon-
venient from a practical standpoint. Long-run steady-states often provide a natural benchmark to study dynamic
economies, but such long-run analyses are not possible for private-information economies without a steady-state
distribution with positive consumption. This has impaired the study of long-run implications of optimal taxation,
so common in the Ramsey taxation literature.
2tion eventually converges to zero. Note, that as a consequence, no steady-state, cross-sectional
distribution with positive consumption exists.
Across generations, this arrangement requires a lock-step link between the welfare of parent and
child. Of course, the perfect intergenerational transmission of welfare improves parental incentives|
but at the expense of exposing newborns to the risk of their parent's luck. Individuals would value
being insured against the uncertainty of their family's fortune|it is often recognized that one of
the biggest risks one faces in life is regarding the family one is born into.
By contrast, it remains optimal to link the fortunes of parents and children in our model, but
no longer in lock-step. Rewards and punishments are distributed over all future descendants, but
in a front-loaded manner. This creates a mean-reverting tendency in consumption|instead of a
random walk|that is strong enough to bound long-run inequality. The result is a steady-state
cross-sectional distribution for consumption and welfare, with no fraction of the population stuck
at misery.
We also study a repeated Mirrleesian version of our economy and derive implications for optimal
estate taxation. In this model, individuals have identical preferences with regard to consumption
and work e®ort, but are heterogenous in the productivity of their work e®ort. Information about
productivity and work e®ort is private|only the resulting output is publicly observable. We show
that the analysis from the taste-shock model carries over to this setup, virtually without change. In
particular, a very similar Bellman equation characterizes the solution to the social planning prob-
lem: consumption exhibits mean-reversion and has a steady-state cross-sectional distribution. This
outcome highlights the fact that our results do not require any particular asymmetry of information.
More importantly, the Mirrleesian model o®ers new insights into estate taxation. Feasible al-
locations can be implemented by combining income and estate taxes. Speci¯cally, we ¯nd that a
progressive estate tax, which imposes a higher average marginal tax rate on the bequests of fortu-
nate parents, is optimal. This result re°ects the mean-reversion of consumption: more fortunate
dynasties, with relatively high levels of current consumption, must have a declining consumption
path induced by higher estate tax rates that lower the net rates of return across generations.
Finally, an important methodological contribution of this paper is to reformulate the social
planning problem recursively. In doing so, we extend ideas introduced by Spear and Srivastava
(1987) to situations where private and social preferences di®er. Indeed, we are able to reduce the
dynamic program to a one-dimensional state variable, and our analysis and results heavily exploit
the resulting Bellman equation.
Related Literature. Our paper is most closely related to Phelan (2005), who considered a
social planning problem with no discounting of the future. He shows that if a steady state for the
planning problem exists then it must solve a static maximization problem, and that solutions to this
problem have strictly positive inequality and social mobility. Our paper establishes the existence
of a steady-state distribution for the planning problem for any di®erence in social and private
discounting. Unlike the case with no discounting, there is no associated static planning problem for
steady-state distributions, and as a result, the methods we develop here are very di®erent.
3In overlapping-generation models without altruistic links, all market equilibria that are Pareto
e±cient place positive direct weight on future generations. Bernheim (1989) was the ¯rst to point
out that in the dynastic extension of these models with altruism, many Pareto e±cient allocations
are not attainable by the market. Kaplow (1995) argued that these Pareto e±cient allocations
are natural social objectives and that they can be implemented by market equilibria with estate
taxation policy. The estate tax is negative|it is a subsidy | so as to internalize the externality of
giving on future generations.
Our work contributes to a large literature on dynamic economies with asymmetric information.
In addition to the work mentioned above, this includes recent research on dynamic optimal taxa-
tion (e.g., Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski, 2003; Albanesi and Sleet, 2004; and Kocherlakota,
2004). This application has been handicapped by the immiseration result and by the non-existence
of a steady-state distribution with positive consumption, making it di±cult to draw long-run con-
clusions for optimal taxation. Our results provide an encouraging way to overcome this problem.
Our work is also indirectly related to Sleet and Yeltekin (2004), who study an Atkeson-Lucas
environment with a utilitarian planner, who lacks commitment and cares only for the current
generation. In this environment, as in Phelan's, it is a foregone conclusion that immiseration will
not obtain, so that the interesting question is how to solve for the best subgame-perfect equilibria.
Sleet and Yeltekin derive ¯rst-order conditions from a Lagrangian and use these to numerically
simulate the solution. Interestingly, it turns out that the best allocation in their no-commitment
environment is asymptotically equivalent to the optimal one with commitment but featuring a more
patient welfare criterion. Thus, our own approach and results provide an indirect, but e®ective
way of characterizing the no-commitment problem and of formally establishing that a steady-state
distribution with no one at misery exists.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the economic environment
and sets up the social planning problem. In Section 3, we develop a recursive version of the planning
problem and draw its connection to our original formulation. The resulting Bellman equation is
then put to use in Section 4 to characterize the solution to the social planning problem. Here we
derive our main results on mean-reversion and on the existence of a steady-state distribution for
consumption. We discuss these results in Section 5 and develop intuition for them by studying
some related problems and reformulations. In Section 6, we turn to the canonical optimal-taxation
setup with productivity shocks and focus on its implications for estate taxes. Section 7 o®ers some
conclusions from the analysis. All proofs omitted in the main text are contained in the Appendix.
2 A Social Insurance Problem
The backbone of our model requires a tradeo® between insurance and incentives. This tradeo®
can be due to private information regarding either productivity or preferences. For purposes of
comparison, we ¯rst adopt the Atkeson-Lucas taste-shock speci¯cation. In Section 6, we adapt our
arguments to a repeated Mirrleesian model with privately observed productivity shocks. Similar
4arguments could be applied to moral-hazard situations with unobservable e®ort choices.
Our positive economy is identical to that of Atkeson-Lucas|the di®erences are only normative.
An in¯nite-lived agent can be interpreted as a dynasty of individuals who have ¯nite lives but are
altruistically linked. Under this interpretation, Atkeson-Lucas and others focus on a particular
set of e±cient allocations: those that only directly consider the welfare of the initial generation.2
In contrast, our interest here lies with e±cient allocations that directly weigh the welfare of all
future generations. This approach is asymptotically equivalent to postulating preferences for an
in¯nitely-lived social planner who is more patient than individuals.
Demography, Preferences and Technology. At any point in time, our economy is populated
by a continuum of individuals who have identical preferences, live for one period, and are replaced
by a single descendant in the next. Parents born in period t are altruistic towards their only child
and their utility vt satis¯es
vt = Et¡1 [µtu(ct) + ¯vt+1 ];
where ct ¸ 0 is the parent's own consumption and ¯ 2 (0;1) is the altruistic weight placed on the
descendant's utility vt+1. The utility function u(c) is assumed continuous and concave, with a contin-
uous derivative for all c > 0 satisfying the Inada conditions limc!0 u0(c) = 1 and limc!1 u0(c) = 0.
The taste shock µ 2 £ is distributed identically and independently across individuals and time.
This speci¯cation of altruism is consistent with individuals having a preference over the entire





s Et¡1 [µt+su(ct+s)]: (1)
In each period, a resource constraint limits aggregate consumption to be no greater than some
constant aggregate endowment e > 0. These speci¯cations choices preferences and technology are
precisely those adopted by Atkeson-Lucas.
De¯ne U ´ u(R+) to be the set of all possible utility values. Note that we allow utility to
be unbounded so that the extremes u ´ u(0) and ¹ u ´ limc!1 u(c) may be ¯nite or in¯nite. The
cost function c(u) is de¯ned on U as the inverse of the utility function c ´ u¡1. For simplicity, we
assume £ contains a ¯nite number of shocks µ ´ µ1 < µ2 < ¢¢¢ < µN ´ ¹ µ. We denote the density
by p(µ) and adopt the normalization that E[µ] =
PN
n=1 µn p(µn) = 1. The level of dynastic utility vt
then always belongs to the set V ´ u(R+)=(1¡¯) with extremes v ´ u=(1¡¯) and ¹ v ´ ¹ u=(1¡¯).
Social Welfare. We depart from Atkeson-Lucas by assuming that the social welfare criterion can





2The ¯nal paragraph in Atkeson Lucas (1992) discusses the possible importance of relaxing this assumption.
5with ^ ¯ > ¯. Thus, social preferences are identical to the individual preferences given by (1), except
for the discount factor.
This setup puts weight on the welfare of future generations directly. Future generations are
already indirectly valued through the altruism of the current generation. If, in addition, they are
also directly included in the welfare function the social discount factor must be higher than ¯. To







±t E¡1 [µtu(ct)]; (3)
where ±t ´ ¯
t + ¯







and social preferences are more patient. In the limit ±t+1=±t ! maxf¯;®g, so the welfare crite-
rion (3) approaches (2) with ^ ¯ = maxf¯;®g.3;4
Atkeson-Lucas' analysis applies to the case with ¯ = ^ ¯, so we focus on the case where enough
weight is placed on future generations to ensure that the long-run social discount factor remains
strictly higher than the private one, ^ ¯ > ¯. Although we adopt the preference in (2) directly for the
rest of the paper, it is straightforward to adapt the arguments to the welfare criterion (3). The two
speci¯cations are slightly di®erent for any ¯nite horizon but are identical for the long-run, which is
our primary concern.
Information and Incentives. Taste shock realizations are privately observed by individuals and
their descendants. The revelation principle then allows us to restrict our attention to mechanisms
that rely on truthful reports of these shocks. Thus, each dynasty faces a sequence of consumption
functions fctg, where ct(µ
t) represents an individual's consumption after reporting the history µ
t ´
(µ0;µ1;:::;µt). A dynasty's reporting strategy ¾ ´ f¾tg is a sequence of functions ¾t : £t+1 ! £
that maps histories of shocks µ
t into a current report ^ µt. Any strategy ¾ induces a history of reports
¾t : £t ! £t. We use ¾¤ to denote the truth-telling strategy with ¾¤
t(µ
t) = µt for all µ
t 2 £t.





















3Bernheim (1989) performs similar intergenerational discount factor calculations in his welfare analysis of a
deterministic dynastic saving model. Caplin and Leahy (2005) argue that these ideas also apply to intra-personal
discounting within a lifetime, leading to a social discount factor that is greater than the private one not only across
generations, but within generations as well.
4One can also adopt the more general welfare criterion
P1
t=0 ®t E¡1vt for some sequence of positive Pareto weights
f®tg. In particular, the sequence ®0 = (1¡^ ¯)=(1¡¯) and ®t = ®0^ ¯t for t ¸ 1 delivers ±t+1=±t = ^ ¯ for all t = 0;1;:::











Social Planning Problem. Following Atkeson-Lucas, we identify each dynasty with a number
v, which we interpret as its initial entitlement to expected, discounted utility, v0 = v. We assume
that all dynasties with the same entitlement v receive the same treatment. We then let Ã denote a
distribution of utilities v across the population of dynasties: Ã(A) is the fraction of dynasties who
will receive expected discounted utility in the set A ½ R.
An allocation is a sequence of functions fcv
tg for each v, where cv
t(µ
t) represents the consumption
that a dynasty with initial entitlement v gets at date t after reporting the sequence of shocks µ
t.
For any given initial distribution of entitlements Ã and resources e, we say that an allocation fcv
tg
is feasible if: (i) it is incentive compatible for all dynasties; (ii) it delivers expected utility of at least
v to all initial dynasties entitled to v; and (iii) average consumption in the population does not
exceed the ¯xed endowment e in all periods. We let e¤(Ã) denote the lowest resource level e such
that there exists a feasible allocation that delivers the distribution of utility entitlements Ã|the
e±ciency problem studied by Atkeson and Lucas (1992) which is relevant for ¯ = ^ ¯.
A social optimum maximizes the average social welfare function (2), weighed by Ã, over all
feasible allocations. That is, the social planning problem given an initial distribution of entitlements










subject to v = U(fcv
tg;¾¤;¯) ¸ U(fcv







t)dÃ(v) · e t = 0;1;::: (5)
Our social planning problem is well de¯ned, with a non-empty constraint set, for all e ¸ e¤(Ã); we
are interested in situations with ^ ¯ > ¯ and where e > e¤(Ã).
Steady States. Our focus is on distributions of utility entitlements Ã such that the solution
to the planning problem features, in each period, a cross-sectional distribution of continuation
utilities vt that is also distributed according to Ã. We also require the cross-sectional distribution
of consumption to replicate itself over time. We term any initial distribution of entitlements with
these properties a steady state and denote them by Ã
¤. As we shall demonstrate below, continuation
utility constitutes a state variable that follows a Markov process, and steady states are then invariant
distributions of this process.
Note that in the Atkeson-Lucas case, with ¯ = ^ ¯, the non-existence of a steady state with
positive consumption is a consequence of the immiseration result: starting from any non-trivial
initial distribution Ã and resources e¤(Ã) the sequence of distributions converges weakly to the
7distribution having full mass at misery, with zero consumption for everyone. We seek non-trivial
steady states Ã
¤ that exhaust a strictly positive aggregate endowment e in all periods.
3 A Bellman Equation
In this section we study a relaxed version of the social planning problem whose solution coincides
with that of the original problem at steady states. The relaxed problem has two important advan-
tages. First, the relaxed problem can be solved by studying a set of subproblems|one for each
dynasty with entitlement v|which avoids the need to keep track of the entire population. Second,
each of these subproblems admits a simple recursive formulation, which can be characterized quite
sharply. We believe that the general approach we develop here may be useful in other contexts.
Consider the relaxed planning problem where the sequence of resource constraints (5) is replaced














for some positive sequence fQtg with
P1
t=0 Qt < 1. One can interpret this problem as representing
a small open economy facing intertemporal prices fQtg. The relaxed and original versions of the
planning problem are related in that any solution to the former which happens to satisfy the
resource constraints in (5) must also be a solution to the latter. A Lagrangian argument establishes
the converse: there must exist some positive sequence fQtg such that the solution to the original
planning problem also solves the relaxed problem. Most importantly, any steady-state solution to
the relaxed problem is a steady-state solution to the original one.
Our focus on steady states leads naturally to Qt = qt for some q > 0. Indeed, steady states
are only compatible with q = ^ ¯, so we adopt this value for the relaxed problem from this point
forward. Attaching a multiplier ^ ¸ > 0 to the intertemporal resource constraint (6), we can form




















and study the optimization of L subject to v = U(fcv
tg;¾¤;¯) ¸ U(fcv
tg;¾;¯) for all v. This is
equivalent to the pointwise optimization, for each v, of the subproblem: k(v) ´ supLv subject to
v = U(fcv
tg;¾¤;¯) ¸ U(fcv
tg;¾;¯). Our ¯rst result characterizes this value function and shows that
it satis¯es a Bellman equation.















v = E[µu(µ) + ¯w(µ)] (8)
µu(µ) + ¯w(µ) ¸ µu(µ
0) + ¯w(µ
0) for all µ;µ
0 2 £: (9)
This recursive formulation imposes a promise-keeping constraint (8) and an incentive con-
straint (9). Intuitively, the latter rules out one-shot deviations from truth-telling, guaranteeing
that telling the truth today is optimal if the truth is told in future periods. Of course, this is
necessary to satisfy the full incentive-compatibility condition (4). Intuitively, the rest is implicitly
taken care of in (7) by evaluating the value function at the continuation utility: for any given
continuation value w(µ), envision the planner in the next period solving the remaining sequence
problem by selecting an entire allocation that is incentive compatible from then on. Then k(w(µ))
represents the value to the planner of this continuation allocation. Taken together, a pair u(µ) and
w(µ) that satis¯es (8){(9) pasted with the corresponding continuation allocations for each w(µ),
yields an allocation that satis¯es the full incentive-compatibility (4). The objective function in (7)
then captures the relevant value of allocations constructed in this way.
Among other things, Theorem 1 shows that the maximum in the Bellman equation (7) is at-
tained. We let the policy functions gu(µ;v) and gw(µ;v) denote the unique solutions for u and w,
respectively. For any initial utility entitlement v0, an allocation futg can then be generated from
the policy functions (gu;gw) by setting u0(µ0) = gu(µ0;v0) initially and de¯ning ut(µ
t) and vt+1(µ
t)





Our next result elucidates the connection between allocations generated from the policy functions
in this way and solutions to the planning problem.
Theorem 2 (a) An allocation futg is optimal for the relaxed problem, given v0, if and only if it
is generated by the policy functions (gu;gw) starting at v0, is incentive compatible, and delivers a
lifetime utility of v0; (b) an allocation futg generated by the policy functions (gu;gw), starting at
v0, has limt!1 ¯
t E¡1vt(µ
t¡1) = 0 and delivers utility v0; (c) an allocation futg generated by the











for all reporting strategies ¾.
Part (a) of Theorem 2 implies that either the solution to the relaxed planning problem is
generated by the policy functions of the Bellman equation, or there is no solution at all. Parts (b)
and (c) of the theorem show that the ¯rst case is guaranteed if we can verify the limit condition in
part (c). The latter is automatically satis¯ed for all utility functions that are bounded below and
can be veri¯ed in many other cases of interest.5
5Theorem 2 involves various applications of versions of the Principle of Optimality. For example, for any given
policy functions (gu;gw) and an initial value v0, the individual dynasty faces a recursive dynamic programming
9The case with ¯ = ^ ¯ can be studied by the same approach. Recall that the e±ciency problem
studied by Atkeson and Lucas (1992) minimizes resources e subject to the sequence of resource
constraints (5) and v = U(fcv
tg;¾¤;¯) ¸ U(fcv
tg;¾;¯) for all v. Consider the relaxed version
of this problem that replaces the sequence of resource constraints with the single intertemporal
constraint (6) for some sequence fQtg. Then if the solution to this problem satis¯es the resource
constraints (5) it is also a solution to the original problem. Although no steady state exists in
this case, with constant relative risk aversion utility functions, the relaxed problem with Qt = qt
AL
characterize the original one, for an appropriately chosen value of qAL > 0, not necessarily equal to
¯.
Since the constraint (6) binds, we can take the objective function for the relaxed problem as
the left hand side of this inequality. This minimization can then be done pointwise: for each v let




t) subject to v = U(fctg;¾¤;¯) ¸ U(fctg;¾;¯). The associated Bellman
equation for this problem is then













subject to (8) and (9). This problem can be thought of as the limiting version of the ^ ¯ > ¯ case as
^ ¸ ! 1 and where the discount factor in the objective qAL is not necessarily ^ ¯. Theorems 1 and 2
also apply to this problem and its Bellman equation.
4 Optimal Inequality
In this section we exploit the connection between the Bellman equation and the planning problem.
We characterize the solution and derive a key equation that illustrates mean-reverting forces in the
dynamics of consumption. The main result of the section is to establish that these forces are strong
enough to imply the existence of an invariant distribution with no misery. Finally, we provide
su±cient conditions to verify part (c) of Theorem 2, and ensure that a solution to the planning
problem exists.
Mean Reversion
We are now in a position to study the Bellman equation's optimization problem. To begin, we
justify the use of ¯rst-order conditions with the following lemma:
Lemma 1 The value function k(v) is strictly concave and di®erentiable on the interior of its do-
main, with limv!¹ v k0(v) = ¡1. If utility is unbounded below, then limv!v k0(v) = 1. Otherwise
problem with state variable vt. Conditions (8) and (9) then amount to guessing and verifying a solution to the
Bellman equation of the agent's problem|in particular, that the value function that satis¯es the Bellman equation,
with truth telling, is the identity function. However, one also needs to verify that this value function represents the
true optimal value for the dynasty from the sequential problem. This veri¯cation is accomplished by part (c) of
Theorem 2.
10limv!v k0(v) = 1.
Let ¸ = k0(v) be the multiplier on the left-hand side of the promise-keeping constraint (8) and
let ¹(µ;µ
0) be the multipliers on the incentive constraints (9). The ¯rst-order condition for u(µ) is
³














with equality if u(µ) is interior. The solution for w(µ) must be interior, given the Inada conditions
















































where fvtg is generated by the policy function gw. Thus, fk0(vt)g is a Conditional Linear Auto
Regressive (hereafter: CLAR) Markov process. Note that we can translate anything about the
process fk0(vt)g into implications for the process fvtg, since the derivative k0(v) is continuous and
strictly decreasing. Likewise, using the policy function gu(µ;v), conclusions about the process fvtg
provide information about the process for consumption.
The conditional expectation in (12) illustrates that ¯=^ ¯ < 1 creates a force for mean reversion
for the process fk0(vt)g toward zero. Lemma 1 implies that the value function k(v) has an interior
maximum at v¤ > v with k0(v¤) = 0, so reversion occurs towards this interior utility level|away
from misery. This feature is key to our results on the existence of invariant distributions.
Economically, the mean-reversion equation itself embodies an interesting form of social mobility.
We can divide the population into two social hierarchies, with mobility ensured between them.
Descendants of individuals with current welfare above v¤ will eventually fall below it. Similarly
dynasties initially entitled to welfare below v¤ are guaranteed to access levels above it. This rise
and fall of families illustrates a strong intergenerational mobility in the model.
In deriving this result, it is important to stress the role played by the non-monotonicity of
the value function k(v). Although mean reversion stems from ^ ¯=¯ < 1 in equation (12), it is
non-monotonicity of k(v) that ensures that reversion is not toward misery. By contrast, in the
Atkeson-Lucas case a CLAR equation similar to (12) may hold, but the value function in this
case is monotone and reversion then occurs toward misery. Indeed, the envelope and ¯rst-order

















which is similar to condition (12) when qAL > ¯.6 Crucially, unlike the case with ^ ¯ > ¯, here
the value function K AL(v) is strictly increasing, so that K0
AL (v) ¸ 0. Thus, fK0
AL(vt)g is a non-
negative process, which implies by the Martingale Convergence Theorem that it must converge
almost surely (a.s.) to some ¯nite value. Since incentives must be provided using continuation
utilities gw(¹ µ;v) 6= gw(µ;v), this rules out anything other than K0
AL(vt) ! 0 a.s. Immiseration then
follows, vt ! v and ct ! 0 a.s. This highlights the importance of the non-monotonicity of the value
function k(v) for our results in the case of ^ ¯ > ¯.
Our next result pushes the characterization of reversion past the average behavior of the fk0
tg
process by deriving bounds for its evolution. These bounds are critical for guaranteeing the existence
of an invariant distribution with no mass at misery.
Proposition 1 The policy function gw(µ;v) satis¯es the CLAR equation (11). In addition:





























for all µ 2 £, where the constants are given by ¹ ° ´ (¯=^ ¯) max
1·n·N
f(1 + µn ¡ E[µ · µn])=µng and
° ´ (¯=^ ¯) min
2·n·N
f1 + µn¡1 ¡ E[µ j µ ¸ µn]=µn¡1g:









for all µ 2 £. For values of v such that k0(v) · 1, the lower bound in (13) holds; the upper
bound in (13) holds for su±ciently high v.
Proposition 1 illustrates a powerful tendency away from misery. For example, with utility
unbounded below, continuation utility gw(µ;v) remains bounded even as v ! ¡1: Thus, no matter
how much a parent is supposed to be punished, his child is always somewhat spared.
6With logarithmic utility qAL = ¯ yields a solution with constant average consumption. With u(c) = c1¡¾=(1¡¾)
and ¾ < 1 the appropriate value of qAL, that yields constant consumption, is strictly above ¯.
12Main Result: Existence of an Invariant Distribution with No Misery
We now state the main result of this section: if a solution to the relaxed planning problem exists,
then it admits an invariant distribution with no misery. The proof of this result relies on the
conditional-expectation equation (12) and the bounds in Proposition 1. Thus, it makes use of both
mean-reversion properties discussed in the previous subsection.7
Proposition 2 The existence of an invariant distribution Ã
¤ with no mass at misery, Ã
¤(fvg) = 0,
for the Markov process fvtg implied by gw is guaranteed if either: utility is unbounded below, utility
is bounded above, or ^ ° < 1.
Proposition 2, when combined with part (a) of Theorem 2, leaves open only two possibilities: (i)
the relaxed problem admits a steady-state invariant distribution with no misery; or (ii) no solution
exists. This situation contrasts strongly with the Atkeson-Lucas case, with ¯ = ^ ¯, where a solution
exists but does not admit a steady state, and everyone ends up at misery. Towards the end of this
section we show that a solution to the planning problem can be guaranteed so that case (i) holds.
Our Bellman equation also provides an e±cient method for explicitly solving the planning prob-
lem. We illustrate this with two examples, one analytical and another numerical.
Example 1. Suppose utility is CRRA with ¾ = 1=2; so that u(c) = 4c1=2 for c ¸ 0 and c(u) = u2=2
for u ¸ 0. For ¯ = ^ ¯ Atkeson-Lucas show that the optimum involves consumption inequality
growing without bound and leading to immiseration.













subject to (8) and (9). This is a linear-quadratic dynamic programming problem, so it follows that










1 (µ)v + °
w
0 (µ)
For taste shocks with su±ciently small amplitude we can guarantee, by continuity with the deter-
ministic case µ = ¹ µ, that °w(µ) < 1 and °w(¹ µ) > 0, implying a unique bounded ergodic set for utility
[vL;vH] with vL > 0. Moreover, gu(µ;v) > 0 for v 2 [vL;vH]. Hence, since the planning problem is
convex and utility turns out to be strictly positive at the steady state, this solution does solves the
original problem with non-negativity constraints on u.
7When utility is bounded below, we either require that utility be bounded above, or that ^ ° < 1, which is ensured
for a small dispersion of the shocks, as a simple way of ensuring that the ergodic set is bounded away from misery.
It seems very plausible, however, that these conditions could be dispensed with.






























Figure 1: Policy functions gw(µ;v)




































Example 2. To illustrate the numerical value of our recursive formulation, we compute the solution
for the logarithmic case with ¯ = 0:9, ^ ¯ = 0:975, e = ^ ¸¡1 = 0:6, µh = 1:2, µl = 0:75 and p = 0:5.
We iterated on the Bellman equation for k(v) until convergence.8
Figure 1 plots the policy function for continuation utility in consumption-equivalent units,
c(v(1 ¡ ¯)) against c(gw(µ;v)(1 ¡ ¯)), while Figure 2 does the same for the policy function for
consumption, c(v(1¡¯)) against gc(µ;v). Both policy functions are monotonic and smooth. Figure
1 reveals a unique, bounded ergodic set for v. Note that both policy functions become nearly °at for
low values of v. This illustrates the result, discussed immediately after Proposition 1, that utility
is kept above some endogenous bound.
Figure 3 displays the steady-state, cross-sectional distribution of dynastic utility measured in
consumption-equivalent units, c(v(1 ¡ ¯)) implied by the solution to the planning problem.9 The
long-run distribution has a smooth bell-curve shape|a feature that must be due to the smooth,
mean-reverting dynamics of the model, since it cannot be a direct consequence of our two-point
distribution of taste shocks. The ¯gure also shows the invariant distributions for various values of
8The details of this numerical exercise where as follows: we solved for u(µ) as a function of w(µ) using the
incentive and promise-keeping constraints. We then maximized over w(µ). We employed a grid for v de¯ned in
terms of equally spaced consumption-equivalent units c((1 ¡ ¯)v) = f0:01;:::;2g. Results with a grid size of 100
and 300 were similar; we report the latter. We used Matlab's splines package to interpolate the value function
and used fmincon.m as our optimization routine over w(µ). Our iterations were initialized with the value function
corresponding to the feasible plan that features constant consumption:
k0(v) =
v(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ ^ ¸c(v(1 ¡ ¯))
1 ¡ ^ ¯
We stopped the iterations when kkn(v)¡kn¡1(v)k < 10¡10 and veri¯ed that the policy functions had also converged.
Note that gw(µ;v) is well within the interior of [:01;2], so that the arbitrary upper and lower bounds from our grid
choice were not found to be binding.
9The invariant distribution was approximated by generated a Monte Carlo simulation for the dynamics of the
fvtg process generated by gw, with an arbitrary initial value of v0. Since this process converges to a unique invariant
distribution Ã
¤, starting from any initial value of v0, the frequencies in a long time-series sample approach the
frequencies of Ã
¤. To create the ¯gure we used Matlab's Wavelet Toolbox to approximate the density from the
simulated Monte-Carlo sample.
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Figure 3: Steady-State Distributions of Dynastic Utility
^ ¯. The degree of inequality appears to decrease with higher values of ^ ¯. This outcome is suggested
intuitively by the coe±cient on the CLAR equation (12) and the discussion in Section 5 on features
of the impulse response to shocks. These simulations also support the natural conjecture that as
we approach the Atkeson-Lucas case, ^ ¯ ! ¯, the resulting sequence of invariant distributions blows
up, since no steady state with positive consumption exists when ^ ¯ = ¯.
We now turn brie°y to issues of uniqueness and stability for the invariant distribution guaranteed
by Proposition 2. This question is of economic interest because it represents an even stronger notion
of social mobility than that implied by the mean-reversion condition (12) discussed in the previous
subsection. That is, if convergence toward the distribution Ã
¤ occurs starting from any initial utility
level v0, then the fortunes of distant descendants|the distribution of their welfare|is independent
of the individual's present condition. At the optimum, the past always exerts some in°uence on the
present, but its in°uence is bounded and dies out over time, so that the advantages or disadvantages
of distant ancestors are eventually wiped out.
Indeed, under some conditions we can guarantee that the social optimum in our model does
display this strong notion of social mobility. To see this, suppose the ergodic set for the fk0
tg
process is compact. This is guaranteed, for example, by applying Proposition 1 when ¹ ° < 1. Then,
if the policy function gw(µ;v) is monotone in v, the invariant distribution Ã
¤ is unique and stable
in the sense that, starting from any initial distribution Ã0, the sequence of distributions fÃtg,
generated by gw, converges weakly to Ã
¤. This follows since the conditional-expectation equation
(12) ensures enough mixing to apply Hopenhayn-Prescott's Theorem.10 The monotonicity of the
10See pg. 382-383 in Stokey and Lucas with Prescott (1989).
15policy functions for continuation utility w seems intuitive and plausible, as illustrated by Examples
1 and 2.11
Another approach suggests uniqueness and convergence without relying on monotonicity. Grun-
wald, Hyndman, Tedesco and Tweedie (1999) show that one-dimensional, irreducible Markov processes
with the Feller property that are bounded below and satisfy a CLAR condition, such as (12), have
a unique and stable invariant distribution. Moreover, convergence to this distribution from any
initial distribution is fast, in the sense that it occurs at the geometric rate ¯=^ ¯. All the require-
ments of their theorem have been veri¯ed already for our model, except for the technical condition
of irreducibility, which is likely to hold if we were to assume that the taste shock has a continuous
distribution. We do not pursue this formally other than to note that the forces for reversion in (12)
could be further exploited to establish uniqueness and convergence.
Our focus on steady states, where the distribution of utility entitlements replicates itself over
time, has exploited the fact that the relaxed and original planning problems must coincide. However,
for the logarithmic utility case we can do more and characterize transitional dynamics.
Proposition 3 If utility is logarithmic, then for any initial distribution of utility entitlements Ã
there exists an endowment level e¤(Ã) such that the solution to the original social planning problem
is generated by the policy functions (gu;gw) from the relaxed problem with Qt = ^ ¯t. The function
e¤ is monotone increasing, in that if Ã
a Á Ã




One interesting application of this result is to the situation where the planning problem is
modi¯ed to select the best initial distribution Ã, instead of taking one as given. Then all initial
dynasties are treated identically and started with identical utility level v¤ solving k0(v¤) = 0. The
optimal allocation then evolves according to the dynamics implied by the policy function gw(µ;v).
The cross-sectional distribution of welfare will spread out from its initially egalitarian condition as
dynasties experience varying luck in the realization of their shocks.
By applying Proposition 3, convergence to a unique invariant distribution Ã
¤ of the Markov
process fvtg implied by the policy function gw(µ;v) takes on additional economic meaning. It implies
the stability of the cross-sectional distributions of welfare and consumption in the population. That
is, if the Markov process fvtg generated by gw is stable, then the cross-sectional distributions of
welfare and consumption eventually settle down to the steady state.
As mentioned in Section 3, for any utility function speci¯cation one can characterize the solution
for any (Ã;e) as the solution to a relaxed problem with some sequence of prices fQtg, that are not
necessarily exponential. Proposition 3 identi¯es the distributions and endowment pairs (Ã;e) that
lead to exponential prices in the logarithmic case. More generally, with logarithmic utility for any
pair (Ã;e), we can show that Qt = ^ ¯t + ¤¯
t for some constant ¤. The entire optimal allocation
can then be characterized by the policy functions from a non-stationary Bellman equation. Since
11Indeed, for the general case it can be shown that gw(µ;v) is strictly increasing in v. However, although we know
of no counterexample, we have not found conditions that ensure the monotonicity of gw(µ;v) for all µ 6= µ.
16prices are asymptotically exponential, in that limt!1 ^ ¯¡tQt = 1, it follows that long-run dynamics
are always dominated by the policy functions (gu;gw) from the relaxed problem with exponential
prices Qt = ^ ¯t that we have characterized.
Su±cient Conditions for Veri¯cation
We conclude this section by describing su±cient conditions for a solution to the planning problem
to exist at the steady state Ã
¤ identi¯ed by the policy functions in Proposition 2. This involves two
steps. First, we establish that allocations generated by the policy functions are indeed incentive
compatible by verifying the condition in part (c) of Theorem 2. Second, we verify that average
consumption is ¯nite under the invariant distribution Ã
¤.
Lemma 2 The allocation generated from the policy functions (gu;gw), starting from any v0, is
guaranteed to be incentive compatible in the following cases: (a) utility is bounded above; (b) utility
is bounded below; (c) utility is logarithmic; or (d) ¹ ° < 1 or ° > 0.
We now ¯nd su±cient conditions that guarantee average consumption is ¯nite under the invariant
distribution Ã
¤. If the ergodic set for utility v is bounded away from the extremes, then consumption
is bounded and average consumption is trivially ¯nite. Even when a bounded ergodic set for utility
v cannot be ensured, ¯nite average consumption can be guaranteed for a large class of utility
functions.











if either (a) the ergodic set for v is bounded; or (b) utility is such that c0(u(c)) is a convex function
of c.
Note that a bounded ergodic set is guaranteed by ¹ ° < 1, which is ensured for taste shocks
with su±ciently small amplitude; and condition (b) holds, for example, for all constant relative risk
aversion utility functions with ¾ ¸ 1.
The value of average consumption depends on the value of ^ ¸. For instance, in the case of
constant relative risk aversion utility, average steady state consumption is a power function of ^ ¸,
and thus has full range. In fact, in this case the entire solution for consumption is homogenous
of degree one in the value of the endowment e. This ensures a steady state solution to the social
planning problem for any endowment level.
5 Discussion: Mean-Reversion
This section develops an intuitive understanding of the key mean-reversion property discussed pre-
viously. We ¯rst derive the impulse response of consumption to a one-time taste shock. We then
17revisit the full problem with an alternative Bellman equation that is useful as a source of intuition.
Impulse Response
Consider a version of our model where only the ¯rst generation faces uncertainty. In the ¯rst
period, there are two possible values for the taste shock µ0 2 fµL;µHg, but thereafter the economy
is deterministic: µt = 1 for t ¸ 1. We compare this to the case with no uncertainty in the ¯rst
period. This allows us to trace out the consumption response to the taste shock over time. To
simplify, we adopt logarithmic utility.
We begin by studying a subproblem of the deterministic planning problem from the second






















log(ct) ¡ ^ ¸ct + ^ ¯kdet(vt+1)
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Condition (14) shows that fk0
det(vt)g reverts geometrically towards zero at the rate ¯=^ ¯. This is
a deterministic version of the conditional-expectation equation (12). In the logarithmic case, it
translates directly into consumption by the ¯rst-order condition (15). Thus, consumption reverts
back to a common steady state at the same rate; deviations from the steady-state level of consump-
tion have a half-life of (log2(^ ¯=¯))¡1. Note that in the Atkeson-Lucas case when social and private
discounting coincide, so that ¯ = ^ ¯, consumption remains perfectly constant after the shock at its
new level ct = c(v1=(1 ¡ ¯)).























18where we omit the other incentive constraint since it is not binding at the optimum, and the problem










implying that v1(µH) < v¤ < v1(µL) where k0(v¤) = 0. Note that average consumption is constant
and equal to ^ ¸¡1 in all periods.
Figure 4 shows the consumption response to a taste shock in the ¯rst period, for subsequent
periods. That is, we use (14) and (15) for t ¸ 1 starting at v1(µL), v¤ and v1(µH). The e®ect
on consumption from the shock dies out over time and consumption returns to a common steady-
state level. Again, this illustrates that the in°uence of past fortunes eventually vanishes for distant
descendants. We also plot the Atkeson-Lucas case with ¯ = ^ ¯, where the luck of the ¯rst generation
has a permanent impact on the consumption of all descendants.


















Figure 4: Consumption path for t ¸ 1 in response to taste shock at t = 0
To provide incentives for the ¯rst generation, society rewards the descendants of an individual
reporting a low taste shock. Rewards can take two forms and society makes use of both. The
¯rst is standard and involves increased consumption spending, in present-value terms. The second
is more subtle and exploits di®erences in preferences: it allows an adjustment in the pattern of
consumption, for a given present value, in the direction preferred by individuals.12
Since individuals are more impatient than the planner, this latter form of reward is delivered
by tilting the consumption pro¯le toward the present. Similarly, punishments involve tilting the
12Some readers may recognize this last method as the time-honored system of rewards and punishments used by
parents when conceding their child's favorite snack or reducing their TV-time. In these instances, the child values
some goods more than the parent wishes, and the parent uses them to provide incentives.
19consumption path toward the future. In both cases, earlier consumption dates are used more
intensively to provide incentives|rewards and punishments are front-loaded. Indeed, consumption
returns to a common steady-state level in the long-run regardless of the initial shock because
a®ecting the consumption of very distant descendants is not an e±cient way for society to provide
incentives to the ¯rst generation.
Another Bellman Equation
Here we develop another Bellman equation that holds for any value of q not necessarily equal to ^ ¯.
This alternative formulation is useful, both as a source of intuition and to motivate our focus on
q = ^ ¯.
Consider the following cost minimization problem




























that is, delivering utility ^ v and v for the planner and individual, respectively. Then the value
function must satisfy the Bellman equation
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µu(µ) + ¯w(µ) ¸ µu(µ
0) + ¯w(µ
0) for all µ;µ
0 2 £:
This formulation could be used to derive all of our results, although the lower-dimensional Bellman
equation (7) is slightly more convenient for that purpose. The advantage of this cost-minimization
formulation, however, is that it lends itself naturally to economic interpretations.
The following story provides a useful reinterpretation and source for intuition. Consider an
in¯nite-lived household with two members, husband and wife, and assume that consumption is
a public good|there is no intra-period resource allocation problem. However, husband and wife
20disagree on how to discount the future. Suppose the wife is more patient, but only the husband
can observe and report taste-shock realizations.
Then this cost-minimization problem characterizes the constrained Pareto problem for this
household, in the sense that the isocost curve K(v; ^ v) = K0 represents, given resources K0, the
Pareto frontier between husband and wife. The Pareto frontier is non-standard in that it is not
everywhere decreasing and does not represent the usual transfer of private goods between two
agents. Instead, it arises from di®erences in preferences that generate a disagreement about the
optimal consumption path for the only public good. Since disagreement on preferences is bounded,
the Pareto frontier is non-monotone and the highest possible utility for the wife is attained for an
interior utility level for the husband, where K1(v¤; ^ v¤) = 0. Reductions in the husband's utility to
the left of this point must also decrease utility for the wife, for a given level of resources.
The ¯rst-order conditions can be rearranged to deliver
























Condition (16) can then be used to argue that a steady-state requires q = ^ ¯. Indeed, if q < ^ ¯, then
fK2tg would increase without bound; likewise, if q > ^ ¯, then fK2tg decreases toward zero. Both
situations clearly do not lend themselves to the existence of an invariant distribution for (v; ^ v).
On the other hand, if q = ^ ¯ then K2(vt; ^ vt) is constant along the optimal path and an invariant
distribution is possible.
When q = ^ ¯, the state (vt; ^ vt) moves along a one-dimensional locus given by K2(v; ^ v) =
K2(v0; ^ v0). Intuitively, since no incentives are required for the wife, she is perfectly insured in
the sense that the marginal cost of delivering welfare to her is held constant across time.
Figure 5 shows that the curve K2(v; ^ v) = K2(v0; ^ v0) for continuation utilities cuts the isocost
curves from below, and cuts K1(v; ^ v) = 0 from above. Intuitively, incentives require foregoing
perfect insurance for the husband and accepting °uctuations in v as rewards and punishments.
Starting from (v¤; ^ v¤), rewards can be delivered in two ways. The optimum makes use of both forms
of rewards, explaining the shape of the schedule for continuation utilities.
The ¯rst form of rewarding involves increasing resources K, and can be seen as an upward
movement along the diagonal K1(v; ^ v) = 0. However, the husband is also rewarded by allowing an
allocation of these resources that is more to his liking, which can be represented as lateral movements
along the Pareto frontier, which at (v¤; ^ v¤) is horizontally °at. The solution combines both forms of
rewards and, as a result, (v; ^ v) travels along K2(v; ^ v) = K2(v0; ^ v0) to the right of K1(v; ^ v) = 0 and
above the initial isocost curve. Note that punishments will push the agent on the upward sloping
section of the Pareto frontier. Thus, ex-ante e±ciency demands ex-post ine±ciency.13
13Returning to the analogy in footnote 12: parents often complain that the punishments they choose to in°ict on
their children hurt them more than they do their kids.
21Figure 5: Isocost curves of K(v; ^ v)
Condition (17) is the analog of the conditional-expectation equation (12) obtained from the
one-dimensional Bellman equation. Here, it implies that the slope of the isocost curve (Pareto
frontier), ¡K1=K2 reverts geometrically toward 0. Thus, (vt; ^ vt) moves along K2(v; ^ v) = K2(v0; ^ v0)
and eventually reverts toward (v¤; ^ v¤). Intuitively, the solution deviates from (v¤; ^ v¤) to provide the
husband with incentives, but it is e±cient to revert back to this point of maximum e±ciency for
the wife: Patience ensures that the wife has her way in the long-run.
6 Estate Taxation
We now turn to a repeated Mirrleesian economy and study optimal taxation. In this version of our
model, individuals have identical preferences over consumption and work e®ort but are heterogenous
regarding their labor productivity, which is privately observed by the individual and independently
distributed across generations and dynasties. We continue to focus on the case where the social
welfare criterion discounts the future at a lower rate than individuals.
Unlike the taste-shock model, here even if we were to restrict allocations to feature no link
between parent and child, there would still be a non-trivial planning problem. Indeed, in each
period the situation would then be identical to the static, nonlinear income tax problem originally
studied by Mirrlees (1971). Moreover, in the absence of altruism, so that ¯ = 0, the social optimum
actually coincides with this static solution. With altruism, however, we shall see below that it is
always optimal to link welfare across generations within a dynasty to enhance incentives for parents.
Despite di®erences between the Mirrleesian economy and our taste-shock model, our previous
analysis can be adapted virtually without change. In particular, a recursive representation can
22be derived, and the Bellman equation can be used to characterize the solution and to establish
that a steady-state, invariant distribution exists. This highlights the fact that our model requires
asymmetric information, but not any particular form of it.
We focus on an implementation of the allocation that uses income and estate taxes, and derive
some interesting results for the latter. We ¯nd that estate taxation should be progressive: more
fortunate parents should face a higher average marginal tax rate on their bequests. This result
re°ects the mean reversion in consumption explained in the previous section. A higher estate tax
ensures that the fortunate face a lower net rate of return across generations, and that consequently
their consumption path decreases over time toward the mean.
Repeated Mirrlees: Productivity Shocks
Each period of this economy is identical to the canonical optimal taxation setup in Mirrlees (1971).
Utility depends on the level of consumption c and work e®ort n. We assume that individuals in
generation t have identical preferences that satisfy
Vt = Et¡1[u(ct) ¡ h(nt) + ¯Vt+1];
but di®er regarding their productivity in translating work e®ort into output. An individual with
productivity w, exerting work e®ort n, produces output y = wn. We assume that productivity w
is independently and identically distributed across dynasties and generations. Thus, the produc-
tivity talents of parent and child are unrelated|innate skills are assumed nonheritable. Given this
assumption, if the optimum features intergenerational transmission of welfare, then it represents a
social decision to provide altruistic parents with incentives in this way, and not a mechanical result
originating from the assumed physical environment.14
For convenience, we adopt the power disutility function h(n) = n°=° so that, de¯ning µ ´ w¡°,





















The right-hand side of this equation leads to a convenient recursive representation of the planning
problem in the continuation utility de¯ned by vt =
P1
s=0 ¯
s Et¡1[u(ct+s¡1)¡µt+sh(yt+s)] (where we
are abusing notation slightly by folding the ¯
¡1 into the de¯nition of the utility function u(c)).















t)dÃ(v) + e t = 0;1;:::
14As in the taste shock model, here the case with ¯ = ^ ¯ leads to immiseration. This case has been studied by
Albanesi and Sleet (2004), who impose an exogenous lower bound on dynastic welfare to circumvent immiseration.
23where individuals are indexed by their initial utility entitlement v, with distribution Ã in the
population.
We continue to assume social discounting is lower than private discounting: ^ ¯ > ¯. The planning




t)g to maximize average social welfare subject to the
incentive-compatibility constraints and the resource constraints.
Using the last expression for the utility function and applying similar reasoning as in the taste-















u¡ ¡ µh(µ) + ¯w(µ)
¤
¡µh(µ) + ¯w(µ) ¸ ¡µh(µ
0) + ¯w(µ
0);
where the function y(h) represents the inverse of the disutility function, y = h¡1. The arguments
that justify the study of this Bellman equation, are similar to those that underlie Theorems 1 and 2
in the context of the taste-shock model. The results regarding steady states parallel those obtained
previously, and imply that an invariant distribution exists with no immiseration, as in Proposition 2.
Implementation with Income and Estate Taxation
Any allocation that is incentive compatible and feasible can be implemented by a combination of
taxes on labor income and estates. Here we ¯rst describe this implementation, and explore some
features of the optimal estate tax in the next subsection.




t)g we propose an implemen-
tation along the lines of Kocherlakota (2004). In each period, conditional on the history of their
dynasty's reports ^ µt¡1 and any inherited wealth, individuals report their current shock ^ µt, produce,
consume, pay taxes and bequeath wealth subject to the following set of budget constraints











Rt¡1;tbt¡1 t = 0;1;::: (18)
where Rt¡1;t is the before-tax interest rate across generations, and initially b¡1 = 0. Individuals are
subject to two forms of taxation: a labor income tax Tt(^ µt); and a proportional tax on inherited
wealth Rt¡1;tbt¡1 at rate ¿t(^ µt).15






t)g, an equilibrium consists of a sequence of interest rates




t)g; and a reporting
strategy f¾v
t(µ
t)g such that: (i) fct; bt; ¾tg maximize dynastic utility subject to (18), taking the
15In this formulation, taxes are a function of the entire history of reports, and labor income yt is mandated given
this history. However, if the labor income histories yt: £t ! Rt being implemented are invertible, then by the
taxation principle we can rewrite T and ¿ as functions of this history of labor income and avoid having to mandate
labor income. Under this arrangement, individuals do not make reports on their shocks, but instead simply choose
a budget-feasible allocation of consumption and labor income, taking as given prices and the tax system.





t)]dÁ(v) = 0 for all t = 0;1;::: We say that a competitive equilibrium is
incentive compatible if, in addition, it induces truth telling.
For any feasible, incentive-compatible allocation fcv
t; yv
tg, we construct an incentive-compatible


















for any sequence of interest rates fRt¡1;tg. These choices work because the estate tax ensures that
for any reporting strategy ¾, the resulting consumption allocation fcv
t(¾t(µt))g with no bequests
bv

































The labor income tax is such that the budget constraints are satis¯ed with this consumption allo-
cation and no bequests. Thus, this no-bequest choice is optimal for the individual regardless of the
reporting strategy followed. Since the resulting allocation is incentive compatible, by hypothesis, it
follows that truth telling is optimal. The resource constraints together with the budget constraints
then ensure that the asset market clears.16
As noted above, in our economy without capital only the after-tax interest rate matters so the
implementation allows any equilibrium before-tax interest rate fRt¡1;tg. In the next subsection,
we set the interest rate to the reciprocal of the social discount factor, Rt¡1;t = ^ ¯¡1: This choice is
natural because it represents the interest rate that would prevail at the steady state in a version of
our economy with capital.
Optimal Progressive Estate Taxation
In this subsection we derive an important intertemporal condition that must be satis¯ed by the
optimal allocation. This condition has interesting implications for the optimal estate tax, computed
using (19) at the optimal allocation.
Let ¸ be the multiplier on the promise-keeping constraint and let ¹(µ;µ
0) represent the multipliers
on the incentive constraints. Then the ¯rst-order conditions for u¡ and w(µ) are
c














16Since the consumption Euler equation holds with equality, the same estate tax can be used to implement alloca-
tions with any other bequest plan with income taxes that are consistent with the budget constraints.





























The left-hand side together with the ¯rst term on the right-hand side is the standard inverse Euler
equation. The second term on the right-hand side is novel, since it is zero when ¯ = ^ ¯ and is strictly
negative when ^ ¯ > ¯.17
In our environment, the relevant past history is encoded in the continuation utility so the estate
tax ¿(µ
t¡1;µt) can actually be reexpressed as a function of vt(µ
t¡1) and µt. Abusing notation we
then denote the estate tax by ¿t(v;µt). Since we focus on the steady-state, invariant distribution,
we also drop the time subscripts and write ¿(v;µ).
The average estate tax rate ¹ ¿(v) is then de¯ned by







Using the modi¯ed inverse Euler equation (20) we obtain








In particular, this implies that the average estate tax rate is negative, ¹ ¿(v) < 0, so that bequests
are subsidized. However, recall that before-tax interest rates are not uniquely determined in our
implementation. As a consequence, neither are the estate taxes computed by (19). With our
particular choice for the before-tax interest rate, however, the tax rates are pinned down and
acquires a corrective, Pigouvian role. Di®erences in discounting can be interpreted as a form of
externalities from future consumption, and the negative average tax can then be seen as a way
of countering these externalities as prescribed by Pigou. In our setup without capital, this result
depends on the choice of the before-tax interest rate. However, the negative tax on estates would
be a robust steady-state outcome in a version of our economy with capital.
In our model it is more interesting to understand how the average tax varies with the history
of past shocks encoded in the promised continuation utility v. The average tax is an increasing
function of consumption, which, in turn, is an increasing function of v. Thus, estate taxation is
progressive: the average tax on transfers for more fortunate parents is higher.
17This equation can also be derived from an elementary variation argument. This is done in Farhi, Kocherlakota
and Werning (2005), who also show that this equation, and its implications for estate taxation, generalize to an
economy with capital and an arbitrary process for skills.
26Proposition 4 In the repeated Mirrlees economy, the optimal allocation can be implemented by a
combination of income and estate taxes. At a steady-state, invariant distribution Ã
¤, the optimal
average estate tax ¹ ¿(v) de¯ned by (19) and (21) is increasing in promised continuation utility v.
The progressivity of the estate tax re°ects the mean-reversion in consumption. The fortunate
must face lower net rates of return so that their consumption path decreases towards the mean.18
7 Conclusions
Should privately-felt parental altruism a®ect the social contract? If so, what are the long-run
implications for inequality? To address these questions, we modeled a central tension in society:
the tradeo® between ensuring equality of opportunity for newborns and providing incentives for
altruistic parents.
Our model's answer is that society should indeed exploit altruism to motivate parents, linking
the welfare of children to that of their parents. However, we also ¯nd that if we value the welfare
of future generations directly, the inheritability of good or bad fortune should be tempered. This
produces a steady-state outcome in which welfare and consumption are mean-reverting, long-run
inequality is bounded, social mobility is possible and misery is avoided by everyone.
What instruments should society use to implement such allocations? For a Mirrleesian version
of our model we ¯nd an important role for the estate tax. The optimal tax on inheritances is
progressive: more fortunate parents should face a higher average marginal tax rate on their bequests.
This result illustrates an interesting way in which the con°ict between corrective and redistributive
taxation is optimally resolved. Further examination of other situations with similar con°icts remains
an interesting direction for future work.19
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
Weak concavity of the value function k(v) follows because the relaxed sequence problem has a
concave objective and a convex constraint set. The weak concavity of the value function k(v) implies
its continuity over the interior of its domain. If utility is bounded, continuity at the extremes can



















t)]. Then k¤(v) is continuous and k(v) · k¤(v), with equality
at any ¯nite extremes ¹ v and v. Then continuity of k(v) at ¯nite extremes follows. Thus, k(v) is
18Farhi, Kocherlakota and Werning (2005) explore more general versions of this result and discuss other intuitions.
19Some progress along these lines can be found in Amador, Angeletos and Werning (2005).
27continuous.
The constraint (6) with q = ^ ¯ implies that utility and continuation utility are well-de¯ned.







is not de¯ned, for some s ¸ ¡1. This implies that limT!1
PT
t=0 ¯
t maxfEsµtu(ct);0g = 1: Since












t Esct + B
Taking the limit yields limT!1
PT




t=0 ^ ¯t E¡1ct = 1: If there is a non-zero measure of such agents this implies
a contradiction of (6). Thus, for both the relaxed and unrelaxed problems utility and continuation
utility are well de¯ned given the other constraints on the problem. This is important for our
recursive formulation below.
We next prove two lemmas that imply the rest of the theorem. Consider the optimization



















µu(µ) + ¯w(µ) ¸ µu(µ
0) + ¯w(µ
0) for all µ;µ
0 2 £ (24)
De¯ne m ´ maxc¸0;µ2£(µu(c) ¡ ^ ¸c) and ^ k (v) ´ k (v) ¡ m=(1 ¡ ^ ¯) · 0. The problem in (22) is














subject to (23) and (24).
Lemma A.1 The supremum in (22), or equivalently (25), is attained.
Proof. If utility is bounded the result follows immediately by continuity of the objective function
and compactness of the constraint set. So suppose utility is unbounded above and below | similar




^ k(v) = lim
v!¡1
^ k(v) = ¡1 (26)
and then use this result to restrict, without loss, the optimization within a compact set, ensuring a
maximum is attained.
28To establish these limits, de¯ne



















t). Since this corresponds to the same problem but without the
incentive constraints it follows that ^ k(v) · h(v; ^ ¯). If limv!1 h(v; ^ ¯) = limv!¡1 h(v; ^ ¯) = ¡1,
then the desired limits (26) follow. Since µu ¡ ^ ¸c(u) ¡ m · 0 and ¯ < ^ ¯ it follows that



















t)]. Note that C(v;¯) is a standard convex ¯rst-best allocation
problem, with solution u(µ
t) = (c0)¡1(µt°(v)) for some positive multiplier °(v), increasing in v and














so that limv!¡1 h(v;¯) = ¡1 and limv!1 h(v;¯) = ¡1. Using the inequality (27) this establishes
limv!¡1 h(v; ^ ¯) = ¡1 and limv!1 h(v; ^ ¯) = ¡1, which, in turn, imply the limits (26).
Fix a v. Take any allocation that veri¯es the constraints (23) and (24) and let k < 1 be
the corresponding value of (25). Then, since the objective is non-positive, we can restrict the
maximization to w(µ) such that ^ k(w(µ)) ¸ ¹ k=(^ ¯p(µ)). Since ^ k(w(µ)) is concave with the limits (26),
this de¯nes a closed, bounded interval for w(µ), for each µ. It follows that there exists Mv;w < 1
such that we can restrict the maximization to jw(µ)j · Mv;w.
Similarly, we can restrict the maximization over u(µ) so that µu(µ) ¡ ^ ¸c(u(µ)) ¡ m ¸ ¹ k=p(µ).
Since (µu ¡ ^ ¸c(u)) is strictly concave, with (µu ¡ ^ ¸c(u)) ! ¡1 when either u ! 1 or u ! ¡1,
this de¯nes a closed, bounded interval for u(µ), for each µ. Thus, there exists an Mv;u < 1 such
that we can restrict the maximization to ju(µ)j · Mv;u.
Hence, we can restrict the maximization in (25) to a compact set. Since the objective function
is continuous over this restricted set, the maximum must be attained.
Lemma A.2 The value function k(v) satis¯es the Bellman equation (7){(9).













29where the maximization is subject to (23) and (24). Then there exists ¢ > 0 such that
k(v) ¸ E
£








































for all incentive-compatible allocations that deliver v, a contradiction with the de¯nition of k(v).
Namely, that there should be a plan with value arbitrarily close to k(v0). We conclude that k(v) ·
maxu;w E[µu(µ) ¡ ^ ¸c(u(µ)) + ^ ¯k(w(µ))] subject to (23 ) and (24).
By de¯nition, for every v and " > 0 there exists a plan f~ ut(µ
t;v;")g that is incentive compatible












¸ k(v) ¡ ":
Let (u¤(µ);w¤(µ)) 2 argmaxu;w E[µu(µ) ¡ ^ ¸c(u(µ)) + ^ ¯k(w(µ))]. Consider the plan u0(µ0) = u¤(µ0)
and ut(µ










































Since " > 0 was arbitrary it follows that k(v) ¸ maxu;w E[µu(µ) ¡ ^ ¸c(u(µ)) + ^ ¯k(w(µ))] subject to
(23) and (24).
Finally, together both inequalities imply k(v) = maxu;w E[µu(µ) ¡ ^ ¸c(u(µ)) + ^ ¯k(w(µ))] subject
to (23) and (24).
Proof of Theorem 2
Part (a). Suppose the allocation futg is generated by the policy functions starting from v0, is
incentive compatible and delivers lifetime utility v0. After repeated substitutions of the Bellman






t) ¡ ^ ¸c(ut(µ










t) ¡ ^ ¸c(ut(µ
t))];
so futg is optimal, by de¯nition of k(v0).
Conversely, suppose an allocation futg is optimal given v0. Then, by de¯nition it must be







and suppose that either u0 (µ) 6= gu (µ;v0) or w0 (µ) 6= gw (µ;v0), for some µ 2 £. Since the original












































The ¯rst inequality follows since u0 does not maximize (7), while the second inequality follows the
de¯nition of k(w0 (µ)). Thus, the allocation futg cannot be optimal, a contradiction. A similar
argument applies if the plan is not generated by the policy functions after some history µ
t and
t ¸ 1. We conclude that an optimal allocation must be generated from the policy functions.
Part (b). First, suppose an allocation fut;vtg generated by the policy functions (gu;gw) starting
at v0 satis¯es limt!1 ¯
t E¡1vt(µ





















t)] so that the allocation futg delivers lifetime utility




Suppose utility is unbounded above and limsupt!1 ¯
t E¡1vt(µ
t) > 0. Then ^ ¯ > ¯ implies that
limsupt!1 ^ ¯t E¡1vt(µ
t) = 1. Since the value function k(v) is non-constant, concave and reaches













t) + b = ¡1
and then (28) implies that k(v0) = ¡1, a contradiction since there are feasible plans that yield
¯nite values. We conclude that limsupt!1 ¯
t E¡1vt(µ
t) · 0.
Similarly, suppose utility is unbounded below and that liminft!1 ¯
t E¡1vt(µ
t) < 0. Then
liminft!1 ^ ¯t E¡1vt(µ










implying k(v0) = ¡1, a contradiction. Thus, we must have liminft!1 ¯
t E¡1vt(µ
t) ¸ 0.
The two established inequalities imply limt!1 ¯
t E¡1vt(µ
t) = 0.
Part (c). Suppose limsupt!1 ¯
t E¡1vt(¾t(µ
t)) ¸ 0 for every reporting strategy ¾. Then after




































Therefore, futg is incentive compatible, since v is attainable with truth telling from part (b).
Proof of Lemma 1
Part (a) (Strict Concavity) Let fut(µ
t;v0);vt(µ
t;v0)g be the plans generated from the policy
functions starting at v0 (note: no claim of incentive compatibility is required). Take two initial











t;va) + (1 ¡ ®)vt(µ
t;vb)
Theorem 2 part (b) implies that fut(µ
t;va)g and fut(µ
t;vb)g deliver va and vb, respectively. This
immediately implies that fu®
t (µ
t)g delivers initial utility v® ´ ®va + (1 ¡ ®)vb. It also implies that































for some history µ







































and averaging we obtain
























































where the strict inequality follows from the strict concavity of the cost function c(u), the fact
that we have the inequality (30), and the weak concavity of the value function k. The last weak
inequality follows from iterating on the Bellman equation for v® since the average plan (u®;v®)
satis¯es the Bellman equations constraints at every step. This proves that the value function k(v)
is strictly concave.
(b) (Di®erentiability) Since the value function k(v) is concave, it is sub-di®erentiable|that
is, there is at least one sub-gradient at every point v. Di®erentiability can then be established by
the following variational envelope arguments.
Suppose ¯rst that utility is unbounded below. Fix an interior value v0 for initial utility. For a



















Since W(v) is the value of a feasible allocation in the neighborhood of v0 it follows that W(v) · k(v),
with equality at v0. Since W 0(v0) exists it follows, by application of the Benveniste-Scheinkman
Theorem (see Theorem 4.10, in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott, 1989), that k0(v0) also exists and
k
0(v0) = W








Finally, since c0(u) ¸ 0 this shows that k0(v) · 1. The limit limv!¡1 k0(v) = 1 is inherited




The limit limv!¹ v k0(v) = ¡1 follows immediately from limv!¹ v k(v) = ¡1; if ¹ v < 1. Otherwise




Next, suppose utility is bounded below, and without loss in generality suppose that the utility
of zero consumption is zero. Then the argument above establishes di®erentiability at a point v0 as
long as gu(µ;v0) > 0, for all µ 2 £. However, corner solutions with gu(µ;v0) = 0 are possible here
even with Inada assumption on the utility function, so a di®erent envelope argument is required.
We provide one that exploits the homogeneity of the constraint set.
If utility is bounded below, then limsupt!1 E¡1¯
tvt(¾(µ
t)) ¸ 0 for all reporting strategies ¾ so
that, applying Theorem 2, a solution futg to the planner's sequence problem is ensured. Then, for
any interior v0, the plan f(v=v0)utg is incentive compatible and attains value v for the agent. In


















satis¯es W(v) · k(v), W(v0) = k(v0) and is di®erentiable. It follows from the Benveniste-
Scheinkman Theorem, that k0(v0) exists and equals W 0(v0).
The proof of limv!¹ v k0(v) = ¡1 is the same as in the case with utility unbounded below. Finally,







ut ¡ ^ ¸c(ut)
¢
subject to v =
P1
t=0 ¯
tut. Note that k(v) is di®erentiable with limv!v k
0(v) = 1: Since deterministic
plans are trivially incentive compatible, it follows that k(v) · k(v), with equality at v. Then we
must have limv!v k0(v) = 1 to avoid a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 1










¹ pn(¹ µnun + ¯wn)
µnun + ¯wn ¸ µnun+1 + ¯wn+1 for n = 1;2;:::;K ¡ 1;
This problem and its notation require some discussion. We do not incorporate the monotonicity
constraint on u. But this notation allows us to consider bunching in the following way. If any set
of neighboring agents is bunched, then we group these agents under a single index and let ¹ pn be
34the total probability of this group. Likewise let ¹ µn represent the conditional average of µ within
this group, which is what is relevant for the promise-keeping constraint and the objective function.
Let µn be the taste shock of the highest agent in the group. The incentive constraint must rule the
highest agent in each group from deviating and taking the allocation of the group above him.
Of course, every combination of bunched agents leads to a di®erent program. We study all of
them. The optimal allocation of our problem must solve one of these programs, although not nec-
essarily the one that yields the highest value, since this one may not be feasible if the monotonicity
condition is violated.
The ¯rst-order conditions are
¹ pnf¹ µn ¡ ^ ¸c
0(un) ¡ ¸¹ µng + µn¹n ¡ µn¡1¹n¡1 · 0
¹ pnf^ ¯k
0(wn) ¡ ¯¸g + ¯(¹n ¡ ¹n¡1) = 0
where, by the Envelope theorem, ¸ = k0(v):
Consider ¯rst case with utility unbounded below, so that the ¯rst order condition for consump-







= 1 ¡ k
0(v)
The ¯rst-order conditions for n = 1 imply










































































Similarly, writing the ¯rst-order conditions for n = K, we get

































































































































0(v)) + 1 ¡
¯
^ ¯



















To arrive at the expression in the text we take the worst case scenario: we choose the subproblem
that is most unfavorable to each bound, noting that 1 ¡ k0(v) ¸ 0.
Turning to the bounded utility case, note that all the ¯rst-order conditions and constraints are
satis¯ed when ¸ ¸ 1 with ¹n = 0 and u(µ) = u and w(µ) = ¯
¡1v > v. The ¯rst-order condition for
w implies k0(w(µ)) = k0(¯
¡1v) = (^ ¯=¯)k0(v). Since the problem is strictly convex, this represents
the unique solution. Recall that in the arguments above establishing the lower bound involved no
assumption on interior solutions for u, so this holds for all v. The upper bound, on the other hand,
did require u(µ) > u for all µ, which must be true for high enough v, i.e. for low enough k0(v).
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider ¯rst the case with utility unbounded below. Since the derivative k0(v) is continuous and









for all x < 1 if utility is unbounded below. For any probability distribution ¹, let TQ(¹) be the




36for any Borel set A. De¯ne
TQ;n ´
TQ + T 2
Q + ¢¢¢ + T n
Q
n
For example, TQ;n(±x) is the empirical average of fk0(vt)gn
t=1 over all histories of length n starting
with k0(v0) = x. The following lemma establishes the existence of an invariant distribution by
considering the limits of fTQ;ng.
Lemma A.3 If utility is unbounded below, then for each x < 1 there exists a subsequence fTQ;Á(n)(±x)g
that converges weakly, i.e. in distribution, to an invariant distribution on (¡1;1) under Q.










= ¯=^ ¯ < 1:
We ¯rst extend the continuous transition function Q(x;µ): (¡1;1)££ ! (¡1;1) to a continuous
transition function ^ Q(x;µ): (¡1;1] £ £ ! (¡1;1), with ^ Q(1;µ) = ¯=^ ¯ and ^ Q(x;µ) = Q(x;µ),
for all x 2 (¡1;1). It follows that T ^ Q maps probability distributions over (¡1;1] to probability
distributions over (¡1;1), and TQ(±x) = T ^ Q(±x), for all x 2 (¡1;1).
We next show that the sequence fT ^ Q;n(±x)g is tight, in that for any " > 0 there exists a compact
set A" such that T ^ Q;n(±x)(A") ¸ 1 ¡ ", for all n. The expected value of the distribution T n
^ Q(±x)
is simply E¡1[k0(vt(µ
t¡1))] with x = k0(v0) < 1. Recall that E¡1[k0(vt(µ
t¡1))
¤

























which implies that fT n
^ Q(±x)g, and therefore fT ^ Q;n(±x)g, is tight.
Tightness implies that there exists a subsequence T ^ Q;Á(n)(±x) that converges weakly, i.e. in dis-
tribution, to some distribution ¼. Since ^ Q(x;µ) is continuous in x, then T ^ Q(T ^ Q;Á(n)(±x)) converges








^ Q (±x) ¡ T ^ Q(±x)
Á(n)
+ T ^ Q;Á(n)(±x)
and since Á(n) ! 1 we must have T ^ Q(¼) = ¼.
Recall that T ^ Q maps probability distributions over (¡1;1] to probability distributions over
(¡1;1). This implies that ¼ = T ^ Q(¼) has no probability mass at f1g. Since TQ and T ^ Q coincide
for such distributions, it follows that ¼ = TQ(¼); so that ¼ is an invariant distribution on (¡1;1)
under Q.
37The argument for the case with utility bounded below is very similar. De¯ne the transition
function Q(x;µ) as above, but for all x 2 R, since now k0(v) can take on any real value. If utility
is unbounded above but ¹ ° < 1 then there exists an upper bound vH < 1 for the ergodic set for
v. De¯ne the utility level v0 > v by k0(v0) = 1. Next, de¯ne vL to be the minimum of the policy
function gw over v 2 [v0;vH], which is de¯ned since gw is continuous over this compact set. If
utility is bounded above then let vL by the minimum of gw over v 2 [v0; ¹ v), which is de¯ned since
limv!¹ v gw(µ;v) = ¹ v. In both cases, since gw > v we must have that this minimum is above misery:
vL > v. Finally, the transition function is continuous with Q(x;µ) · k0(vL) < 1. The rest of the
argument is then a simple modi¯cation of the one above for utility unbounded below, with k0(vL)
playing the role of 1 (things are actually slightly simpler here, since no continuous extension of Q
is required).
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider indexing the relaxed planning problem by e by setting ^ ¸ = e¡1, with associated value func-
tion k(v;e). We ¯rst show that if an initial distribution Ã satis¯es the condition
R
k0(v;e)dÃ(v) = 0,
then the solution to the relaxed problem and original problem coincide. We then show that for any
initial distribution there exists a value for e that satis¯es this condition.






: Applying the law of
iterated expectations to (12) then yields
E¡1
£














With logarithmic utility c0(u) = c(u), so that
R
k0(v;e)dÃ(v) = 0 implies
R
E¡1[ct]dÃ = ^ ¸¡1 = e
for all t = 0;1;::: The allocation is incentive compatible by Lemma 2 below, and applying part (c)
of Theorem 2, it follows that it must solve the original planning problem.
Now consider any initial distribution Ã. We argue that we can ¯nd a value of ^ ¸ = e¡1 such that
R
k0(v;e)dÃ(v) = 0. The homogeneity of the sequential problem implies that
k(v;e) =
1








Note that k0(v ¡ 1
1¡¯ log(e);1) is strictly increasing in e and limits to 1 as e ! 1, and to ¡1 as














de¯nes a unique value of e¤ for any initial distribution Ã. The monotonicity of e¤(Ã) then follows
immediately by using the fact that k0(¢;1) is a strictly decreasing function.
38Proof of Lemma 2
(a) If utility is also bounded below, then the result follows from part (b). So suppose utility is
unbounded below, but bounded above. Then k0(gw(¹ µ;¢)) is continuous and Proposition 1 implies
that limv!¡1 k0(gw(¹ µ;v)) = 1. It follows that maxv k0(gw(¹ µ;v)) is attained, so there exists a vL >
¡1 such that gw(¹ µ;v) > vL.
(b) If utility is bounded below, the result follows immediately from part (c) of Theorem 2.










With logarithmic utility this implies that gu(¹ µ;v) ¡ gu(µ;v) · log
¡¹ µ=µ
¢
. The incentive constraint
then implies that gw(µ;v) ¡ gw(¹ µ;v) · (¹ µ=¯)log(¹ µ=µ) ´ A. It follows that vt(^ µt¡1) ¸ vt(µ
t¡1) ¡ tA
for all pairs of histories µ


















From part (b) of Theorem 2 we have limt!1 ¯
t E¡1[vt(µ
t¡1)] = 0. Since limt!1 ¯




(d) If ° > 0 then the bound in (13) implies that k0 ¡
gw ¡¹ µ;v
¢¢
¸ 1 ¡ ¯=^ ¯ and the result follows
immediately. If ¹ ° < 1, then we can de¯ne · = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¯=^ ¯)=(1 ¡ ¹ °), and de¯ne vH by k0(vH) = ·:
Then for all v · vH we have gw(µ;v) · v. It follows that the unique ergodic set is bounded above
by vH. We can now apply the argument in (a) so there exists a vL > ¡1 such that gw ¡¹ µ;v
¢
> vL.
Proof of Lemma 3




¤(v) = 0 under the invariant distribution Ã
¤. If utility is unbounded below
then all solutions for consumption are interior. If utility is bounded below, then corner solutions
with gc(µ;v) = 0 for some µ can only occur for low enough levels of v, so that gc(µ;v) is bounded,
for all µ in this compact set. Recall that for interior solutions
1 ¡ k

















































The result then follows since c0(u(c)) is an increasing function of c.
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